Yesterday’s post discussed how direct evidence “proves impermissible discriminatory bias without additional inference or presumption,” i.e., the proverbial smoking gun. But smoking gun evidence in discrimination cases is rare. Employers aren’t out there telling employees that their race will cost them their jobs.
Well, most employers, that is.
Last night, I read an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision with shocking allegations.
One of the defendants is a city in Georgia. The other defendant ran for election as Chairman of the City Commission. According to the plaintiff, as part of the individual defendant’s campaign, he publicly stated his intent to “replace Caucasian employees with African Americans,” to lead “an entirely African American” City Commission, and to replace the plaintiff, the white City Manager, with a black City Manager.
The plaintiff further alleged that the individual defendant campaigned on social media, saying, “Structure needs to change . . . More Blacks!!!”; “The new City Manager should be Black” and “It is time for African Americans to run our city.”
The individual defendant won the election. That day, after he and fellow commissioners took their oaths of office, at the individual defendant’s encouragement, the Commission voted on racial lines to fire the plaintiff and replace him with a black City Manager. As Chairman, the individual defendant did not vote. However, he and another black commissioner told the plaintiff he could not return to his former position as Finance Director because he “did not look like” them.
Does that sound like discrimination to you? It does to me.
But, get this. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to allege that the “Commission itself” acted with a racially discriminatory motive. Although the plaintiff alleged that the individual defendant “expressed an intent to replace [him] with a person of color,” he “did not take part in the vote that resulted in [his] termination.”
However, the Eleventh Circuit thought the lower court was cutting it too fine on a motion to dismiss. Indeed, a complaint states a claim if its factual allegations permit a “reasonable inference” that the defendant is liable. Here, the plaintiff alleged that the individual defendant “led, directed, and encouraged” his fellow commissioners to fire the plaintiff and replace him “with an African American candidate.” And that’s precisely what happened.
Credit to the defendants’ employment lawyers for getting a judge to grant a motion to dismiss, albeit a short-lived victory. But where were they when the elected officials allegedly concocted this blatantly racist plan?